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THE N.F.L.'S FINAL VICTORY OVER Smith v. Pro-
Football, Inc.: SINGLE ENTITY-INTERLEAGUE
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
HE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE (N.F.L.) was established in July, 1919,
in Canton, Ohio. Before its organization, there had been dozens of pro-
fessional teams in the midwest and in upper New York state. The League, in
its embryonic stage, was called the American Professional Football Asso-
ciation, and the price of a franchise in the new league was only twenty-five
dollars. These early years were hectic. There were no schedules for fifteen
years. Games were arranged whenever there was a possibility of a good gate,
and players continually jumped teams for an extra payday.'
Professional football has since expanded into a multi-million dollar
business. In 1978 the N.F.L. got off to its best start in history. Its first round of
fourteen games in early September drew a record opening attendance
totaling 822,000, an average of about 58,700 per game.2 The average player's
salary was $55,000.00. 3 The average annual gross revenue of an N.F.L. team
was 8.9 million dollars, and the N.F.L. has negotiated a four year, 656 million
dollar contract with the three national networks that will bring each of the
twenty-eight teams more than five million dollars per year.4
As could be expected, the financial expansion of the N.F.L. has been
accompanied by the promulgation of league rules to ensure league stability.
These rules include several player service market restraints, which have been
adopted by the N.F.L. to ensure competitive equality between the franchises.
This note analyzes the validity of these restraints under the Sherman Anti-
trust Act in light of the recent decision of the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals in Smith v. Pro Football, Inc.5 and presents a new approach
to the economic structure of the N.F.L. which may validate the current
restraints.
The first restrictive process is the "player draft,"6 which entitles the
drafting team to the exclusive right to negotiate for the services of each player
drafted by it. No other team is permitted to negotiate with the selected player
without the consent of the drafting team. This prevents competitive bidding
for the services of a drafted player.
Second, each player must sign a Standard Player Contract 7 before a team
'R. TREAT, THE OFFICIAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FOOTBALL 23 (8th ed. 1969).
2 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., October 16, 1978, at 61.
3 SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 17, 1978, at 34.
4 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., October 16, 1978, at 61.
5 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
6 The N.F.L. draft, which has been in effect since 1935, is a procedure under which the
negotiating rights to graduating college football players are allocated each season among the
N.F.L. franchises, in inverse order of the clubs' standing, unless a club has traded away draft
choices. The team with the poorest record during the preceding season has the first pick, the team
with the next poorest record has the next choice, and so on until the past season's Super Bowl
winner has picked last. At this point, the first round of the draft is completed. The procedure lasts
seventeen rounds in all. N.F.L. Constitution and By-Laws §§ 14.3 and 14.5.
7 The Standard Player Contract is a preprinted contract issued by the league. In antitrust suits
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may employ him. 8 Under the contract, which extends to May 1 of the next
year, the player agrees to comply with the N.F.L. Constitution and By-laws.
The third player service market restraint is the "tampering rule,"9 which
prohibits a team from negotiating with any player under contract to any other
team. The tampering rule and standard player contract restraints, taken
together, effectively limit a player's time for negotiation to three months, since
the contract extends to May 1 and most teams prefer to have player
negotiations completed by the time summer camp begins.
Fourth, the "Rozelle Rule"'1 essentially requires the club which signs a
player from another team to compensate the player's former team. If the two
clubs are unable to conclude mutually satisfactory arrangements, the
commissioner will award compensation in the form of current players, future
draft choices, or both, as he in his sole discretion deems fair and equitable.
The Rozelle Rule restrains player mobility primarily because of its effect on
prospective signing teams, which are reluctant to risk losing key players and
valuable draft choices at the commissioner's discretion.
the rules which require a player to sign the contract, and not the contract itself, normally come
under attack. But see note 11 infra.
N.F.L. Constitution and By-Laws §§ 15.1 and 15.4 provide:
15.1 All contracts between clubs and players shall be executed in triplicate and be in the
form adopted by the member clubs of the League; such contract shall be known as the
"Standard Player Contract." Subject to the provisions of section 9.1(C) (8) hereof, a club
may delete portions of or otherwise amend the Standard Players Contract subject to the
right of the Commissioner to disapprove the same, as provided by section 15.4 hereof.
15.4 The Commissioner shall have the power to disapprove any contract between a
player and a club executed in violation of or contrary to the Constitution and By-Laws of
the League, or if either contracting party is or has been guilty of conduct detrimental to
the League Or to professional football. Any such disapproval of a player contract must
be exercised by the Commissioner within ten (10) days after such contract is filed with
the Commissioner.
8 See Kapp v. National League, 390 F. Supp. 73, 81 (N.D. Colo.), aff'd in part and dismissed in
part as moot, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978).
N.F.L. Constitution and By-Laws § 9.2 provides:
If a member club or any officer, shareholder, director, partner, employee, agent or
representative thereof, or any person holding an interest in said club shall tamper,
negotiate with, or make an offer to a player on the Active Reserve or Selection List of
another member club, then unless the offending club shall clearly prove to the
Commissioner that such action was unintentional, the offending club, in addition to
being subject to all other penalties provided in the Constitution and By-Laws, shall lose
its selection choice in the next succeeding Selection Meeting in the same round in which
the affected player was originally selected in the Selection Meeting in which he was
originally chosen. If such affected player was never selected in any Selection Meeting,
the Commissioner shall determine the round in which the offending club shall lose its
selection choice. Additionally, if the Commissioner decided such offense was
intentional, the Commissioner shall have the power to fine the offending club and may
award the offended club 50 percent of the amount of the fine imposed by the
Commissioner. In all cases the offended club must first certify to the Commissioner that
such an offense has been committed.
10 The "Rozelle Rule" is embodied in N.F.L. Constitution and By-Laws § 12.1(H), which
states:
Any player, whose contract with a League club has expired shall thereupon become a
free agent and shall no longer be considered a member of the team of that club following
the expiration date of such contract. Whenever a player, becoming a free agent in such
manner, thereafter signed a contract with a different club in the League, then, unless
mutually satisfactory arrangements have been concluded between the two League
clubs, the Commissioner may name and then award to the former club one or more
players, from the Active Reserve, or Selection List (including future selection choices)
of the acquiring club as the Commissioner in his sole discretion deems fair and
equitable; any such decision by the Commissioner shall be final and conclusive.
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The final restrictive measure is the "option clause," I which grants a club
the right to unilaterally renew the player's contract for a second year in the
event that it and the player cannot reach an agreement. During this option
year, the player risks a poor performance or an injury which would seriously
restrict his negotiability in the future.
I. BASIC ANTITRUST DOCTRINES: THE RULE OF REASON
AND PER SE ILLEGALITY
Professional football, unlike professional baseball, has not been granted an
exemption from the antitrust laws.'2 As a result, the restrictive rules of
professional sports have become frequently litigated issues.13 Considering the
number of player service market restraints, it is not surprising that players
have instituted suits against the N.F.L. for violations of the Sherman Antitrust
Act.' 4
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "[e]very contract, combina-
" The "option clause" is embodied in § 17 of the Standard Player Contract:
RENEWAL. Unless this contract specifically provides otherwise, Club may, by sending
written notice to Player on or before the April 1 expiration date referred to in Paragraph
1, renew this contract for a period of one year. The terms and conditions for the renewal
year will be the same as those provided in this contract for the last preceding year,
except that there will be no further right of renewal in Club and, unless this contract
specifically provides otherwise, the rate of compensation for the renewal year will be 90
percent of the rate of compensation provided in this contract for the last preceding year.
The phrase "rate of compensation" as used above means yearly salary, including
deferred compensation, and any performance bonus. In order for Player to receive 90
percent of any performance bonus under this contract he must meet the previously
established conditions of that bonus during the renewal year.
12 The Supreme Court cases dealing with the application of the antitrust laws to sports
evolved from Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). In an era long
before baseball reached its present proportions, a unanimous Court, per Mr. Justice Holmes, held
that the business of giving baseball exhibitions was not trade or commerce in the common usage
of the words and that interstate travel was merely incidental to the game. Thus, the Court
concluded that professional baseball was not subject to the Sherman Act. The Court was asked to
reconsider this ruling in Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953), but without
examining the changes that had occurred in baseball since 1922, it affirmed its decision to exempt
baseball from the antitrust laws. The Court gave four reasons for the exemption: (1) congressional
awareness and inaction with respect to Federal Baseball; (2) baseball's development in reliance
upon its exemption from the antitrust laws; (3) a reluctance to overrule Federal Baseball due to
retroactive effect; and (4) a professed desire that the remedy should be supplied by Congress
rather than by the courts. Id. at 357. Over the years, baseball has been challenged for antitrust
violations, but the doctrine of Federal Baseball has prevailed. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258,
272 (1972).
In 1957, a private antitrust action was brought for damages suffered by a player who was
blacklisted by the N.F.L. for signing with another professional football league in violation of his
standard player contract. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957). The League
relied upon Federal Baseball, but the Court limited the reach of that case to baseball alone,
holding that football was subject to the antitrust laws. This view was similarly stated in Flood,
with the Court reaffirming the antitrust exemption for baseball but stating that "professional
sports operating interstate - football, boxing, basketball, and presumably, hockey and golf -
are not so exempt." 407 U.S. at 282-83.
11 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445
(1957); United States v. International Boxing Club of New York, 348 U.S. 236 (1955); Deesen v.
Professional Golfers Ass'n of America, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966); Washington State Bowling
Proprietors Ass'n v. Pacific Lanes, Inc., 356 F.2d 37 (9th Cir. 1966); Boston Professional Hockey
Ass'n v. Cheevers, 348 F. Supp. 216 (D. Mass. 1972); Molinas v. National Basketball Ass'n, 190 F.
Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
4 Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1976).
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tion . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce."1 5 While this
language is broad enough to render nearly all business transactions illegal, the
United States Supreme Court, in Standard Oil Co. v. United States,'6
established a judicial gloss on the statute which mitigates its potential effects,
making the rule of reason the prevailing mode of analysis. Under the rule of
reason, the trier of fact considers the activity's alleged anticompetitive effects
on the relevant market and the business reasons presented for the activity.
Short term restrictions in competition may have beneficial long term
consequences. 7 Some agreements, although they eliminate competition
between the parties, may strengthen competition in the market place.', In
sum, if it can be shown that the alleged anticompetitive conduct is not
anticompetitive in intent or overall effect, the conduct does not violate the rule
of reason and is therefore not an illegal restraint of trade.19 However, once
anticompetitive effect has been shown, the standard of proof required to
validate a challenged practice is whether its primary effect is to foster and
promote competition in the market place, with the anticompetitive effects
being merely incidental.
While no single test allows certain determination of when an activity is
unreasonable under the rule of reason, the Supreme Court has offered factors
which are relevant. Chicago Boqrd of Trade v. United States20 is instructive in
this regard:
[t]he true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
15 Id. § 1. Also relevant to our inquiry is section 2 of the Act, which states:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several states, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding fifty
thousand dollars. or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said
punishments, in the discretion of the court.
Id. § 2.
16 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
17 The Supreme Court in National Soc'y of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S.
679,688-89 (1978), noted the English case of Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181, 24'Eng. Rep. 347
(1711), in which the seller of a bakery, as a part of the sale, promised not to compete with the
purchaser. The Supreme Court noted that although the promise restricted competition, its overall
effect was to enhance competition within the industry by facilitating sales of businesses.
s See, e.g., Continental TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). Continental was a
franchised dealer of Sylvania. Sylvania's franchise plan limited the number of franchises granted
for any given area, and required each franchise to sell his Sylvania products only from the location
or locations at which he was franchised. Dissatisfied with its treatment under the plan,
Continental claimed the franchise plan restricted competition between retailers of Sylvania
products and therefore was a per se illegal vertical restriction. The Supreme Court held that while
vertical restraints hinder intrabrand competition, they have the potential to promote interbrand
competition and therefore may be reasonable. See notes 106-12 infra and accompanying text for
a discussion of Continental TV.
" The Supreme Court in United States v. American Tobacco, 221 U.S. 106 (1911), held that
the acquisition and perpetuation of control over the tobacco trade by the defendant and its
accessory and subsidiary corporations, through purchasing or obtaining majority interests in
numerous competitors and in concerns manufacturing the elements necessary for tobacco
products, contravened both sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. In examining the reasonableness
of the restraints employed, Chief Justice White stated that "the words 'restraint of trade' only
embraced acts or contracts or agreements or combinations . . . which either because of their
inherent nature or effect or because of the evident purpose of the acts, etc., injuriously restrain
trade .. .- Id. at 179 (citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), which had been
decided only two weeks earlier).
20 246 U.S. 231 (1918). The Court upheld the adoption of a "call" rule by a giant grain market,
under which members were prohibited from purchasing or offering to purchase grain at a price
[Vol. 27:541
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merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To
determine that question, the court must ordinarily consider the facts
peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint
and its effect, actual and probably. The history of the restraint, the
evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy,
and the purpose or end sought to be attained, all are relevant facts.
21
Essentially, then, the rule of reason is an analysis of the effect the restraint has
on the economic area within which it operates and whether its use can be
justified in that context.
The judicial inquiry mandated by the rule of reason is often laborious and
burdensome. As antitrust law evolved, the courts discovered certain restraints
to be so consistently unreasonable that they were deemed illegal per se,
without investigation into their intent or effects. A per se rule is a judicial
shortcut; it represents the judgment of the courts that after considerable
experience with one particular restraint, the normal mode of analysis, the rule
of reason, can be omitted. The Supreme Court, in Northern Pacific Ry. v.
United States,2  explained the per se rule stating that there are certain
restraints so pernicious in nature and so lacking in any redeeming virtue that
there could be no valid justification for their existence. 23 Therefore, proof of
the existence of such a restraint constitutes a violation of the antitrust laws, and
a reviewing court need look no further. Among the practices which have been
deemed so pernicious as to be per se illegal are certain group boycotts. 24
Applying these principles in the context of the N.F.L.'s player service
market restraints has proven difficult, largely due to the unique economics of
"league sports," wherein teams compete athletically but cooperate for
economic reasons. Because the player service market restraints ostensibly
benefit only the athletic competition, while adversely affecting economic
competition by restraining player mobility, decreasing negotiability, and
holding down player salaries, the N.F.L. has been unable to justify them
economically.
II. Kapp AND Mackey: THE PLAYER SERVICE MARKET
RESTRAINTS BEFORE Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc.
Both Kapp v. National Football League2 5 and Mackey v. National Football
other than the bid at the close of business (the "call") until the ovening of the next session. The rule
was intended for the convenience of market members and to break a monopoly controlled by a
few warehousemen. Due to the short duration of the "call" rule, its legitimate purpose and the fact
that no effect on prices had been proved, the rule was reasonable.
21 Id. at 234.
22 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
21 Id. at 5. In Northern Pacific the Court designated tying arrangements as a per se violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act, holding illegal Northern Pacific's practice of requiring grantees or
lessees of Northern Pacific's land adjoining the railroad right-of-way to ship their products over
the Northern Pacific, provided its rates were equal to those of competing carriers.
14 See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 145-46 (1966); Klor's, Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207,212-13 (1959); Fashion Originators' Guild of America,
Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); see also notes 44-46 infra and accompanying text.
25 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd in part and dismissed in part as moot, 586 F.2d 644
(9th Cir. 1978).
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League26 stressed the unique economic status of professional football in
finding that the player service market restraints were not per se illegal group
boycotts. Both found the restraints clearly unreasonable under the rule of
reason, while stating that sufficient tailoring to meet the goals sought would
validate the restraints.
The plaintiff in Kapp, after playing out his option with the Minnesota
Vikings, contracted with the New England Patriots for the 1970 season and for
the following two years. He played in 1970, but when he refused to sign the
Standard Player Contract in 1971, he was told to leave the team prior to the
start of that season. 27 The plaintiff alleged that the player draft, the tampering
rule, the option clause, the Rozelle Rule, the Standard Player Contract, and
the commissioner's overall interpretive powers amounted to a group boycott,
and as such a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. He also claimed
that they were illegal under the rule of reason.28
The court decided that the rule of reason was the appropriate test for
determining the legality of the challenged rules. The per se rule was
inapplicable due in part to the unique nature and purpose of sports league
activities. 29 In applying the rule of reason test to the player service market
restraints, the court found "league enforcement of most of the rules .. .so
patently unreasonable that no genuine issue for trial existed"30 and granted
summary judgment for the plaintiff.
In Mackey a group of present and former N.F.L. players, including such
well-known stars as Kermit Alexander, John Mackey, Alan Page, Clint Jones,
Gene Washington, and Nate Wright, alleged that the defendant's enforcement
of the Rozelle Rule 3' constituted, an illegal combination and conspiracy in
restraint of trade, denying professional football players the right to freely
contract for their services. 32 The district court held that the defendant's
enforcement of the Rozelle Rule constituted a group boycott and was
therefore a per se violation of the Sherman Act. Alternatively, the court held
the enforcement invalid under the rule of reason standard. 33 The N.F.L.
appealed, raising two issues: whether the so-called labor exemption to the
antitrust laws immunized the N.F.L.'s enforcement of the Rozelle Rule from
antitrust liability,34 and if not, whether the enforcement of the Rozelle Rule
was in fact unreasonable under the antitrust laws.
26 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
27 390 F. Supp. at 76-78.
21 Id. at 78-79.
29 Id. at 81; see notes 80-92 infra and accompanying text.
30 390 F. Supp. at 82.
31 The Rozelle Rule gives the Commissioner power to require a team which signs a player
from another team to give draft choices, players, etc., to the team losing the player, if the two
teams cannot mutually agree on compensation therefor. See note 10 supra.
32 543 F.2d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 1976).
31 Mackey v. National Football League, 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975), aff'd, 543 F.2d 606
(8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 424 U.S. 801 (1977).
"' The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals listed three requirements of the labor exemption: (1)
the restraint must only affect the two bargaining parties; (2) the restraining rule must be a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining; and (3) the agreements must be the product of bona
fide arm's length bargaining. The player agreements in which the Rozelle Rule was embodied
met the first two requirements, but not the last, because in the most recent union-management
[Vol. 27:541
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In determining the second issue, the court held the per se standard
inapplicable due to the unique and novel business under consideration and
also because the basic purpose in applying the per se standard, the avoidance
of lengthy and burdensome inquiries, had already been frustrated.35 Applying
the rule of reason standard, the court stated that the Rozelle Rule must be no
more restrictive than necessary to serve its legitimate purpose in order to be
reasonable, held the Rozelle Rule to be more restrictive than necessary,
and therefore did not decide if the Rule was essential to maintaining the
competitive balance in the N.F.L. Thus, the Rozelle Rule standing alone was
held to be an unreasonable restraint of trade.
36
III. Smith v. Professional Football, Inc.:
TRAPPED BETWEEN Kapp AND Mackey, AND Professional Engineers
After Kapp and Mackey, Smith v. Professional Football, Inc., 37 a private
antitrust action challenging the N.F.L. draft, reached the District Court of the
District of Columbia. Plaintiff James McCoy (Yazoo) Smith was an All-
American football player at the University of Oregon in 1968. The
Washington Redskins, choosing twelfth, picked Smith as their first round
draft choice. After several months of negotiations in which Smith was
represented by an agent, Smith signed a one year version of the Standard
Player Contract. The contract awarded Smith a $23,000.00 "bonus" for sign-
ing, an additional $5,000.00 if he made the team, and a salary of $22,000.00,
for a total first year compensation of $50,000.00. Smith made the team and
performed excellently until he suffered a serious neck injury in the final game
of the 1968 season. His doctors advised him to give up professional football.
After his injury the Redskins paid Smith $19,800.00, representing the amount
he would have received had he played out the second year of his contract (the
option year).3s
Two years after his injury Smith filed suit in federal district court against
Pro-Football, Inc., which operates the Redskins, and against the N.F.L.,
contending that the draft as it existed in 1968 was an unreasonable restraint of
trade in violation of sections 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act 9 and that but for the
draft he would have negotiated a far more lucrative contract when he was
signed as a player in his first year.
negotiations the player's union had merely accepted the status quo and had not engaged in arm's
length bargaining over the Rozelle Rule. Therefore, the labor exemption did not apply. Mackey
v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 616 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 424 U.S. 801
(1977); see also Reynolds v. N.F.L., 584 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1978).
11 543 F.2d at 619.
36 Id. at 622.
37 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976), afl'd, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
31 See note 11 supra.
,9 See text accompanying note 15 supra for section one of the Act. Section three provides in
part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in the form
of trade or commerce in any territory of the United States or of the District of
Columbia . . . or between any such territories and any State or States or the District of
Columbia, or with foreign nations, or between the District of Columbia and any State or
States or foreign nations, is declared illegal.
15 U.S.C. § 3 (1976).
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After a trial without a jury, District Judge Bryant held that the N.F.L. draft
as it existed in 196840 constituted a group boycott and was therefore a per se
violation of the Sherman Act. Alternatively, the court stated that the draft, if
tested under the rule of reason, was an unreasonable restraint because it was
"significantly more restrictive than necessary" to accomplish whatever
legitimate goals the N.F.L. had.
41
The Kapp and Mackey decisions and the district court's decision in Smith
establish a trend in judicial policy concerning player service market restraints
and the antitrust laws. The restraints are too restrictive, and if not tailored to
suit the goals sought, are unreasonable and illegal under the rule of reason
standard. The unique economic situation of the N.F.L. as a league sport was
sufficient to remove the restraints from per se illegality in Kapp and Mackey,
but in all three decisions the restraints were too restrictive to be reasonable. It
was against this background that the Smith case reached the court of appeals.
The legality of the N.F.L. player draft under antitrust law was essentially a
question of first impression before the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals. 42 Initially the court had to decide whether the legality of the draft
was to be governed by a per se rule or by the rule of reason; having deter-
mined that the draft was not a group boycott, the court then faced the
question of whether the draft, if tested by the rule of reason, was a reasonable
restraint.
A. Which Standard Governs?
In determining the first issue, the Smith court held that the player draft was
not a per se illegal group boycott.43 The classic group boycott is a concerted
attempt by competitors at one level to protect themselves from competition
from non-group members who seek to compete at that level. The boycotting
group combines to deprive the boycotted group from business relationships
which it needs in order to enter or survive at its customary operating level. The
boycotting group may accomplish this exclusion through various means: (1)
by inducing suppliers not to sell to competitors; 44 (2) by inducing customers
not to buy from them;4 5 or (3) by refusing to deal with would-be competitors
40 The present draft is far less restrictive than the 1968 draft. It continues fewer rounds, thus
applying to fewer players, it eliminates the selecting team's "perpetual" right of negotiation with
its players, it facilitates players becoming "free agents," and it establishes minimum salary levels
for "rookies." See 593 F.2d at 1176, n.6.
41 420 F. Supp. 738, 747 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
42 Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S.
801 (1977), held that the Rozelle Rule violated the antitrust laws. See text accompanying note 34
supra. The district court in Kapp v. National Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974),
afi'd in part and dismissed in part as moot, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), held that the discharge of a
player because he refused to sign a Standard Player Contract constituted an unreasonable
restraint of trade. Although the district court found that the "draft rule" was an unreasonable
restraint on trade, it did not examine the draft in detail but dismissed it as invalid because it was
"so patently unreasonable." Id. at 82.
43 593 F.2d at 1178.
41 See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
4- See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
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themselves.46 The common characteristic of the group boycott is the
boycotting group's attempt to restrict competition at its own level.
The Smith court held that the N.F.L. player draft differed from the classic
group boycott in two significant respects: (1) the N.F.L. clubs which
combined were not competitors in any economic sense, and (2) the N.F.L.
clubs had not combined to exclude competitors or potential competitors from
their own level of the market. The court noted that while the N.F.L. clubs
must compete on the field, they must cooperate economically. In order to
maintain spectator interest, the entertainment product must be of high
quality. This requires keeping the teams competitively balanced. In short, the
N.F.L. is a "league sport."47 No N.F.L. team is interested in driving another
team out of business, whether in the counting house or on the playing field, for
if the league fails, no team can survive. The N.F.L. clubs thus do not qualify as
competitors in any economic sense.
The court also held that the N.F.L. clubs had not combined to exclude
competitors or would-be competitors from their level of the market because
the plaintiff Smith had never sought to compete with the N.F.L. clubs;
furthermore, their refusal to deal with him had resulted in no decrease in
competition in providing football entertainment to the public.48 In view of
these differences, the court concluded that "the N.F.L. player draft cannot be
properly described as a group boycott - at least not the type of group boy-
cott that has traditionally elicited invocation of a per se rule. '"4 9
The court was correct in holding that the draft was not a per se illegal
group boycott. The United States Supreme Court decisions holding group
boycotts illegal per se have involved boycotts aimed at horizontal
competitors; 50 the plaintiff Smith was not a horizontal competitor of the
N.F.L. clubs. As previously stated, a group boycott is characterized by a
refusal to deal with competitors, with third parties who deal with
competitors, or by a refusal to deal with competitors except on terms so
discriminatory as to exclude them from competition. 5' Since Smith was not a
competitor of the N.F.L., the player draft was not a traditional group boycott
and was not subject to the rule.52
46 See, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963); Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
47 See pp. 556-57 infra.
41 593 F.2d at 1179.
49 Id. at 1178.
50 Horizontal competitors are business entities which compete at the same level of production
or sales. For example, a manufacturer is a horizontal competitor of other manufacturers but not of
retail sellers. See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. People's Gas, Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961);
Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Associated Press v. United States,
326 U.S. 1 (1945); Fashion Originators Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
,' See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
52 The Smith court's statement that, "the N.F.L. player draft cannot properly be described as a
group boycott - at least not the type of group boycott that has traditionally elicited invocation of
a per se rule," 593 F.2d at 1179, appears to contradict the traditional per se standard of illegality.
Under the per se analysis the plaintiff need only prove that the forbidden activity exists. The court
takes no cognizance of the facts peculiar to the case which would provide justification. For
example, if price fixing is proved, regardless of the nature of its purpose, the result is a finding of
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B. Is the Draft Reasonable?
The second issue before the court was whether the 1968 N.F.L. player
draft was an unreasonable restraint of trade under the rule of reason standard.
The district court had held that the draft was unreasonable because it was
"significantly more restrictive than necessary" to accomplish whatever
legitimate goals the N.F.L. had. The Smith court affirmed the district court's
holding.5 However, during the interim, the Supreme Court rendered its
decision in National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States,-4
which changed the calculus of the rule of reason. As a result, although the
court affirmed the district court's holding of unreasonableness, it based its
decision on a legal analysis derived from Professional Engineers.
The Smith court interpreted Professional Engineers as limiting those
procompetitive benefits which would offset the draft's anticompetitive effects
to strictly economic benefits.-- The defendants, in justification, had asserted
only that the draft had the legitimate purpose of promoting playing field
equality, which in turn provided better entertainment to the public, higher
player salaries and increased financial security for the clubs.56 The court
refused, or failed, to follow these assertions to their logical conclusion when it
indicated that the draft is procompetitive, if at all, in a very different sense
from that in which it is anticompetitive. The draft may be very
procompetitive on the playing field, but this does not increase competition, in
the economic sense, by encouraging others to enter the market or by offering
the product at a lower cost. In strict economic terms, the draft's demonstrated
procompetitive effects are "nil."5 7 Therefore, since the procompetitive
aspects of the player draft do not foster or promote economic competition
between the teams, the draft is an unreasonable restraint of trade.
per se illegality. Here, however, the Smith court indicated that while group boycotts are per se
illegal, certain group boycotts are not per se illegal. According to the Smith court:
When confronted with concerted refusals to deal that do not fit the classic "group
boycott" pattern, the courts almost without exception have held the per see [sic] rule
inapplicable. In reaching this conclusion, however, they have vacillated between two
divergent paths. Some courts have adhered to the traditional canon that all group
boycotts are illegal per se, and concluded that the concerted activity at issue was not a
group boycott. See, e.g., Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors,
Ltd., 416 F.2d 71, 76-79 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970). Other courts
have held that the concerted activity at issue was a group boycott, but that there were
two types of group boycotts - "per se boycotts" and "rule of reason boycotts" - and
that the concerted activity at issue fell into the second category. See, e.g., 11 VON
KALINOWSKI, ANrrrs'r LAW AND TRADE REGULATION § 76.02 at 76-11 (1978) (citing
cases).
Id. at 1179 n.22.
Note that under either approach, the rule of reason is subsequently applied to determine the
activity's legality.
5' Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738,746 (D.D.C. 1976), afl'd, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C.
Cir. 1978).
54 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
55 593 F.2d at 1173.
-1 Id. at 1188.
5' Because the draft's "anticompetitive" and "procompetitive" effects are not comparable, it is
impossible to "net them out" in the usual rule-of-reason balancing. The draft's "anticompetitive
evils," in other words, cannot be balanced against its "procompetitive virtues," and the draft
cannot be upheld if the latter outweighs the former. In strict economic terms, the draft's
demonstrated procompetitive effects are nil. Id. at 1186.
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It is critical to note, however, that the N.F.L. player draft does result in
positive, economic procompetitive benefits. 58 The Smith court failed to
pursue the benefits of competitive balance to their logical end because it took
a limited view of the N.F.L.'s economic status in the national market. Having
discovered no offsetting economic benefits for the draft, and realizing the
potential impact of its decision on the N.F.L. and other league sports, the
Smith court attempted to mitigate these effects by misinterpreting the rule of
reason.
The court correctly interpreted Professional Engineers as limiting to
economic benefits those procompetitive effects which would offset the anti-
competitive restraints of the player draft. In Professional Engineers, the
United States brought a civil antitrust suit against the National Society of
Professional Engineers, alleging that its canon of ethics, which prohibited its
members from submitting competitive bids for engineering services,
suppressed competition in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The
Society defended on the ground, inter alia, that the canon was justified under
the rule of reason because it was adopted by members of a learned profession
for the purpose of minimizing the risk that competition would produce
inferior engineering work, endangering public safety.
The Supreme Court held that a professional society's ban on competitive
bidding violated section 1 of the Sherman Act, rejecting the "public safety"
defense and calling it "nothing less than a frontal assault on the basic policy of
the Sherman Act."5' 9 Although the rule of reason gives the Sherman Act both
"flexibility and definition," it "does not open the field of antitrust inquiry to
any argument . . . within the realm of reason . . . [but requires the trier of
fact to focus] impact on competitive conditions.."60 Because the professional
society could assert only public safety as justification for its restriction on
competitive bidding, there was clearly no economic benefit which could be
balanced against the economic anticompetitive effects of the restriction. With
somewhat limited vision, due in part to the N.F.L.'s failure to clearly assert an
expanded view of the N.F.L.'s economic status in the national market,6 1 the
Smith court drew the analogy between the noneconomic benefits of public
safety and those of the draft.
Therefore, the Smith court correctly interpreted Professional Engineers as
requiring the alleged restraint to have positive, economic procompetitive
benefits in order to be found reasonable under the rule of reason standard.
However, the court contradicted this interpretation in its conclusion by
stating that:
[r]ather, a player draft can survive scrutiny under the rule of reason
only of it is demonstrated to have positive economically procompet-
itive benefits that offset its anticompetitive effects, or, at the least,
58 See notes 93-97 infra and accompanying text.
19 435 U.S. at 695.
60 Id. at 1363. The purpose of antitrust analysis, the court concluded, "is to form a judgment
about the competitive significance of the restraint; it is not to decide whether a policy favoring
competition is in the public interest, or in the interest of members of an industry. Subject to
exceptions defined by statute, that policy decision has been made by Congress." Id. at 1365.
6 See text accompanying note 56 supra for the N.F.L.'s asserted justifications. See notes 93-99
infra and accompanying text for a more appropriate view of the N.F.L.'s economic status.
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if it is demonstrated to accomplish legitimate business purposes and
to have a net anticompetitive effect that is insubstantial.62
There is only one test under the rule of reason. The Smith court apparently
misconstrued two descriptions of the same standard, the rule of reason, as
being two separate tests. In order to understand the court's error it is necessary
to examine the early judicial development of the rule of reason.
C. The Necessity of Procompetitive Benefits -
Foundations of the Rule of Reason
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "every contract, combina-
tion . . . or conspiracy in restraint of trade." But as Mr. Justice Brandeis
noted, restraint is the essence of every trade regulation and contract.64 As
a result, when the Supreme Court was presented with the first alleged anti-
trust violations, it was in a "sea of doubt" as to the practical limits of section 1
of the Sherman Act.65 In response to the necessity for practical limits on the
Sherman Act, the rule of reason standard was formulated.
Professor Bork identifies four judicial opinions as forming the cornerstones
of the rule of reason:66 Justice Peckham speaking for the Court in United
States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn;67 Chief Justice White speaking for the
Court in Standard Oil Co. v. United States6 and United States v. American
Tobacco;69 and then Judge Taft, in his opinion for the Sixth Circuit in United
States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co.70
1. Justice Peckham in Trans-Missouri
It appeared that Justice Peckham in Trans-MissourP had called for a
rigid, literal reading of the Sherman Act. Justice White dissented because he
believed that Justice Peckham had failed to provide the Sherman Act with the
flexibility required to make it practical in an economy based upon private
contracts, which necessarily involved restraints. However, contrary to Justice
White, Justice Peckham was not opposed to flexibility in application of the
62 593 F.2d at 1188-89.
63 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
64 "[T]he legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so simple a test, as
whether it restrains competition. Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade,
restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence." Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246
U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
65 Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74
YALE L.J. 775, 780 (1965).
66 Id. The following analysis draws heavily upon Professor Bork's authoritative work.
67 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
68 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
69 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
70 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898).
71 166 U.S. 290 (1897). Trans-Missouri involved an agreement among a number of competing
railroads engaged in interstate traffic for the purpose of mutual protection. The agreement called
for the establishment of reasonable rates and rules and regulations on all freight traffic, both
through and local, and the formation of an association to prescribe rates, which when agreed
upon were to govern all the companies, and which subjected a defaulting company to a pecuniary
penalty. The agreement was held to be in restraint of trade and therefore invalid.
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Sherman Act, for he introduced a sophisticated power of discrimination into
the law in his definition of the term "restraint of trade.
7 2
2. Judge Taft in Addyston Pipe and Steel
After Trans-Missouri, but before clarification of its meaning by the
Supreme Court, Judge Taft attempted to provide the Sherman Act with a
workable formula in Addyston Pipe and Steel.73 Judge Taft based his
formulation upon the common law notion of "ancillary restraints." For a
restraint to be legal it must be ancillary to, i.e., commensurate with and
necessary to, a legal transaction.7 4 This formulation does not eliminate the
requirement that for a restraint to be legal, its overall effect must be to
promote or foster competition. By a restraint being ancillary to a legal
transaction, Judge Taft meant that while the restraint restricts competition, it
is necessary, to a transaction which promotes competition, to a greater degree
than the restraint itself restricts competition.
3. Chief Justice White in Standard Oil and American Tobacco
Finally, Chief Justice White in Standard Oil and American Tobacco
developed the modem rule of reason. The Chief Justice stated the principle of
the rule of reason in Standard OiF5 and restated it in American Tobacco: "the
words 'restraint of trade' . . . only embraced acts or contracts or agreements
or combinations .. .which, either because of their inherent nature or effect
or because of the evident purpose of the acts, etc., injuriously restrain
trade ... "76 White's rule of reason consisted of a three-pronged test. The
restraints must not be inherently anticompetitive in nature, purpose or intent.
If the restraints are in their inherent nature anticompetitive, they are per se
illegal. If the restraints are not in their inherent nature anticompetitive, then
they must be shown not to be anticompetitive in their effect or intent. To
satisfy these two prongs of White's test, one must prove that the overall result
of the restraints is procompetitive.
Regardless of the formulation of the proper test, the restraint must foster
or promote competition. "White's acceptances of Trans-Missouri and . . .
his own three-part test result in a rule of reason, largely, if not completely,
convertible either to Peckham's test of direct and indirect restraints or
72 Justice Peckham stated "[a] contract which is the mere accompaniment of the sale of
property, and thus entered into for the purpose of enhancing the price at which the vendor sells it,
which in effect is collateral to such sale, and where the main purpose of the whole contract is
accomplished by such sale, might not be included within the letter or spirit of the statute in
question." Id. at 329.
71 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898).
11 Id. at 290-91.
75 The rule of reason prohibits "all contracts or acts which are unreasonably restrictive of
competitive conditions, either from the nature or character of the contract or act or where the
surrounding circumstances were such as to justify the conclusion [that they had not the]
legitimate purpose of reasonably forwarding personal interest and developing trade." 221 U.S. at
58.
76 United States v. American Tobacco, 221 U.S. 106, 179 (1911).
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Taft's test of ancillary and non-ancillary restraints. '7 7 For example, if a
restraint is anticompetitive in its inherent nature - i.e., per se illegal under
the White test - it would be non-ancillary under the Taft formulation be-
cause its anticompetitive effects would be so great that it could never be
commensurate with, and therefore ancillary to, a legal transaction. Thus
the determination whether a restraint is anticompetitive in its inherent
effect or intent, under White's test, is the same determination made under the
Taft formulation, i.e., is its overall effect anticompetitive?"
Under the rule of reason there is one test. The Smith court may have
misconstrued Judge Taft's theory of ancillary restraints as permitting
restraints which do not promote competition. Regardless of the analysis used,
however, procompetitive benefits are necessary for a restrictive practice to be
valid under the rule of reason. Further, the Supreme Court in Professional
Engineers required that the procompetitive benefits be economic in nature.
The public safety justification asserted there clearly produced no economic
benefits, but the N.F.L. player service market restraints, when viewed
properly as concerns the N.F.L.'s economic status, just as clearly provide
economic procompetitive benefits. In order to understand the truth of this
statement an economic analysis of the N.F.L. and its teams is necessary.
IV. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE N.F.L. -
THE SINGLE ENTITY AND INTERLEAGUE STRUCTURAL ANALYSES
A. Economic Motivation Within the N.F.L. -
Cooperation, Not Competition
Competition is a commonly used word. In the context of professional
football and antitrust, two definitions are relevant: "official participation in a
sport" and "rivalry in business for customers or markets."79 However, the
Smith court held that since only positive, economic procompetitive benefits
would offset the anticompetitive effects of the player service market
restraints, competition which can be defined as "official participation in
organized sport" must be excluded from consideration as noneconomic. In
order for the N.F.L. player draft, or other player service market restraints, to
pass muster under the antitrust laws, the overall intent and effect must be to
enhance rivalry in business for customers or markets, i.e., there must be
positive, economic procompetitive benefits.
Although the phrase "rivalry in business for customers or markets" serves
to differentiate economic competition from "official participation in
organized sports," a more refined definition is required for a proper
examination of competition as it exists in the N.F.L. Drawn from numerous
judicial interpretations of "competition," the following is an accurate
11 Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74
YALE L.J. 775, 805 (1965).
71 If its overall effect is anticompetitive, it is unreasonable and therefore illegal under the
White test. If the overall effect is anticompetitive under the Taft formulation, it means the
anticompetitive effects of the restraint itself outweigh the procompetitive effects of the
legitimate transaction and the restraint is not commensurate with, and thus not ancillary to, the
transaction.
" WEaSTER's NEW WORLD DIcrIONARY 289 (2d ed. 1968).
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expression of economic competition: the efforts of two or more parties acting
independently80 to secure the same trade, in the same territory 2 by
furnishing their merchandise or rendering their service better or cheaper than
each other; 3 economic competition is rivalry84 for superiority' 5 in the market
system.
In seeking to apply this definition to the N.F.L., it must be recognized that
professional football and other professional team sports such as hockey,
baseball, and basketball have unique characteristics which distinguish them
from other business enterprises. While professional football teams are in some
respects normal, individual economic units competing to sell a service to the
public, economic competition with other pro-football teams is not the sole
determinant of their behavior. Although they are rivals in combat, they are
also partners in a joint venture called the National Football League.
Professional sports leagues present a unique form of economic competition,
where members must compete fiercely in some respects and cooperate in
others. The end "product" of each team is competition on the playing field,
but the demands of producing the best sports entertainment possible often
require cooperation in the economic sphere.
80 In Lipson v. Socony Vacuum Corp., 87 F.2d 265 (Ist Cir. 1937), it was held that defendants'
policy of selling gasoline in tank cars at prices less than when sold in tank trucks or tank wagons,
provided that the buyer agrees to sell no other oil companies' products, wvas not violative of the
Clayton Act as substantially lessening competition. In the course of the decision the court defined
competition as "the efforts of two or more ...parties to secure the custom of a third party by
the offer of the most favorable terms," and as "the struggle between rivals for the same trade at the
same time; the act of seeking or endeavoring to gain what another is endeavoring to gain at the
same time." Id. at 270.
"' The court in Stockton Dry Goods Co. v. Girsh, 221 P.2d 186 (Cal. App. 1950), implied an
obligation on the part of a corporation not to operate a shoe department in its store where it leased
space to a tenant engaged in selling shoes. The court defined competition as "the effort of two or
more parties acting independently to secure the custom of a third party by the offer of the most
favorable terms." Id. at 188.
12 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts refused to enjoin a shoe store's use of the
name "Emerson's Shoes" upon the suit of a plaintiff managing women's and children's clothing
stores under the name of "Emerson's Fashions" because the competition between the stores was
negligible and there was no intent to deceive the public. The court defined competition as existing
"'only where both parties are soliciting purchasers of similar goods in the same territory at the
same time." Silbert v. Kerstien, 318 Mass. 476, 479, 62 N.E.2d 109, 111 (1945).
s3 The court in Continental Securities Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit, 207 F. 467 (S.D.N.Y.
1913), held that although stockholders had assisted in the formulation of an illegal combination,
this did not affect their power to mortgage corporate property for legitimate business purposes.
The court defined competitors as "persons endeavoring to do the same thing and each offering to
perform the act, furnish the merchandise, or render the service better or cheaper than his rival."
Id. at 470.
s1 The Supreme Court of Montana, in Merchants' Nat'l Bank of Glendive v. Dawson County,,
93 Mont. 310, 19 P.2d 892 (1933), held that a tax on national bank shares is not unlawfully
discriminatory as compared with a tax on moneyed capital of business and loan associations and
insurance companies, in view of the absence of evidence of competition. Competition was
defined as "rivalry between aspirants for .. . advantage in business." Id. at - 19 P.2d at 896.
8- In Simmons v. Johnson, 11 So. 2d 710 (La. Ct. App. 1942), the grantor contracted with
grantee not to compete with grantees in the restaurant business within a specified area.
Thereafter, the grantor contracted with a third party to erect a restaurant three blocks from lots
previously conveyed to the grantees, and to convey the property to the third party. The grantor
did not try to obtain for himself any of the business which the grantees were trying to get for
themselves, and did not share in the operation of the third party's business. The court held that the
grantor was not a "competitor" within the meaning of grantee's contract, defining "competition,"
inter alia, as "strife for superiority." Id. at 712.
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In a free market system such as exists in the United States, each individual,
functioning, economic unit seeks to improve the quality of its product in order
to compete more effectively and therefore capture a larger share of the
market. The natural corollary of such a system is that each economic unit
strives to improve its own product at the expense of its competitors.
However, in professional league sports such as the National Football
League, theoretically conflicting economic goals exist. Each team seeks to
improve the quality of its own team through the draft, player trades, free
agents, improved scouting analysis, more competent coaching staffs, and so
on. But each team also has a great interest in maintaining the quality of its
playing field competitors at a level nearly equal to its own.
The desire of a football team to maintain the quality of its playing field
competitors is premised upon the assumption that if the result of any
individual contest is seen as inevitable, the contest will have little or no
customer attractiveness. Continuation of this pattern will result in the league's
eventual financial demise.16 Under this theory, the failure to maintain
competitive balance could easily result in total domination of the league by
one team, from its inception to its collapse. The abrupt failure, for example, of
the All America Football Conference graphically illustrates that, unlike other
individually functioning economic units in a free market system, it is essential
to the survival of each pro-football team to maintain the quality of their
playing field competitors.17
The necessity to maintain playing field balance is implicit in the
distinction, differentiating pro-football from other business enterprises,
which is identified by the concept "league sports."88 As compared to boxing or
golf, which may be more appropriately viewed as periodic exhibitions of
sporting contests, the major characteristic of league sports is that no team can
rest its success upon the league race, play-offs and championship. In order for
any team to continue to succeed economically, it is necessary that its league
81 Baseball's history supports this assumption. Baseball teams operated for many years
without a player draft, developing their own talent in minor leagues after signing young players at
an early stage of their career through competitive bidding against other teams in the league. See
generally Krasnow & Levy, Unionization and Professional Sports, 51 GEo. L. J. 749, 755 n.19
(1963). "This pre-reserve clause era in baseball was characterized by club jumping by players and
constant internecine warfare between clubs and leagues." Note, Player Control Mechanisms in
Professional Team Sports, 34 U. Prrr. L. REV. 645, 651 n.31 (1973). The 1952 REPORT OF THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE STUDY OF MONOPOLY POWER of the HOUSE COMMITrEE ON THE JUDICIARY
concluded that "[b]aseball's history shows that chaotic conditions prevailed when there was no
reserve clause." H.R. REP. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., at 229 (1952), as quoted in 34 U. PITT. L.
REV. at 651 n.31. Eventually baseball decided that its system was leading to competitive
imbalance and excessive bonuses, so a free agent draft was introduced in 1965. Note, The
Superbowl and the Sherman Act: Professional Team Sports and the Antitrust Laws, 81 HARV. L.
REV. 418, 422-23 (1967).
87 See H. CLAASSEN & S. BODA, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FOOTBALL (3d ed. 1963). From its inception in
1946 to its collapse after the 1949 season, the All America Football Conference was totally
dominated by the Cleveland Browns. Under the guidance of the legendary Paul Brown, the
Browns won all four league championships, compiling an overall record of forty-seven wins, four
losses and three ties and outscoring their opponents 1,561 to 669. As might be expected in such a
situation, the attendance at Brown's games in the early stages of the conference averaged
between sixty and seventy thousand, but had dwindled to twenty thousand by the fourth season,
after which the conference collapsed.
88 Note, Player Control Mechanisms in Professional Team Sports, 34 U. PITT. L. REV. 645,651
(1973).
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have standardized rules, team schedules, and, most importantly, player
control systems to ensure balanced competition. Thus, professional football,
as a league sport, must act in many respects as a single entity to ensure its
survival.
There is no economic competition between the N.F.L. franchises.8 9 The
N.F.L. clubs do not compete in the same territory; rather the market for each
club extends only as far as its fans are willing to travel to attend its games.90 In
effect, the N.F.L., through its franchise system, has granted each team a
monopoly over its own market.9 1 Therefore, no competition exists for the
same trade, i.e., fans in the same territory. The competition that exists within
the N.F.L. is athletic, not economic, competition. Although attempts have
been made to validate the player service market restraints under the rule of
reason by showing their beneficial effect on inter-team playing field
competition, these benefits are not economic in nature as required by the rule
of reason, so that such attempts must fail. As the Smith court stated,
Professional Engineers holds that only economic procompetitive benefits will
offset the anticompetitive effects of restrictive practices such as the N.F.L.
player draft.
The Smith court, however, seemed reluctant to invalidate the player
service market restraints for all time, so it expressed the rule of reason as two
tests, the second allowing future validation of the restraints if they have a
legitimate business purpose and an insubstantial net anticompetitive effect. 92
Such brutalization of the key rule of reason test would have been unnecessary
had Pro-Football, Inc. or the N.F.L. argued, or had the Smith court
recognized, that under at least one other viable means of economic analysis
the player service market restraints clearly do have positive, economic
procompetitive benefits which offset their anticompetitive effects.
B. An Alternative Structural Analysis - the
Single Entity Approach
The economic procompetitive. benefits of the player service market
restraints will not be found within the N.F.L.'s structure. The focus should be
placed instead upon the N.F.L. as a single, functioning economic unit, a single
business entity. With this perspective the market becomes national, and the
N.F.L. itself becomes the economic competitor of other professional sports
leagues or of other entertainment packages. The individual teams do not
89 Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1178-79 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see notes 80-85 supra
and accompanying text for a definition of economic competition.
" Although it might be argued that each team's market is national when its game is televised,
and that it therefore competes with other N.F.L. clubs being televised in the same time slot, the
Sports Broadcast Act permits the N.F.L. to bargain as a unit for telecasting rights, the revenues of
which are shared equally by all teams. See note 103 infra and accompanying text. Thus, so far as
television is concerned, there is clearly no economic competition between N.F.L. clubs, and the
only appropriate view of economic competition involved is that of the N.F.L. as an entity
competing against other entertainment packages for increased air time.
9 Potential exceptions to this statement, such as the Oakland Raiders and San Francisco
Forty-Niners or the New York Jets and the New York Giants, exist only because the N.F.L. has
determined that the local market involved can support two franchises.
11 See text accompanying note 62 supra.
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compete but cooperate to produce for consumers a form of entertainment
called professional football. 93
If the N.F.L. had thus been considered a single business entity, the Smith
court would have discovered the economic procompetitive benefits of the
N.F.L. draft. The court acknowledged that the draft had improved the
competitive quality of the teams on the playing field 94 but held that such
procompetitive benefits were not of the nature required by the Supreme
Court in Professional Engineers. However, if Pro-Football, Inc. or the Smith
court had taken the analysis one step further, it would have been discovered
that by improving the competitive equality of all football teams, the draft
had improved the quality of professional football, thereby enabling it to
compete more efficiently with other forms of professional sports or with other
entertainment products.
For example, the Cleveland Browns' economic competitors may be seen
as the other professional sports teams in Cleveland: the basketball Cavaliers,
the baseball Indians, 95 the soccer Cobras, and so on. These teams compete for
the same trade, spectators, in the same territory, the Cleveland market area. 96
In order to draw fans, each sports league attempts to produce an
entertainment product of higher quality than its competing sports organi-
zations. 97
'3 Perhaps an analogy would aid in illustrating this proposition. One might consider the N.F.L.
as one large national corporation, with the franchised clubs as corporate offices located in the
various cities throughout the country. Commissioner Rozelle is the corporate president and
chairman of the board; team owners are vice-presidents and members of the board; and head
coaches are the managers of the various corporate offices. In order to maintain the quality of its
service the corporation must maintain the quality of each individual office, and not improve one
at the cost of another. However, should the corporate office managers decide to transfer
employees, they are free to do so. The various corporate offices clearly are not economic
competitors with one another, but are all members of the same economic "team," the National
Football League.
94 593 F.2d at 1179.
'5 The considerable conflict of popular opinion as to whether football has overtaken the
"grand old game" of baseball as this country's favorite sport indicates a popular awareness of the
competition which exists between professional football and professional baseball. This
competition, and the necessity of the player service market restraints, will increase, because, as
White Sox owner Bill Veeck recently stated, we are presently experiencing a "baseball
renaissance." U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., October 16, 1978, at 61.
56 The Cleveland market designates the market territory in which the Cleveland Browns are
able to compete, and is determined by the distance which the average fan is financially able, as
well as personally disposed, to travel in order to attend a game.
" To elaborate, the potential season ticket purchaser who lives in the Cleveland market has a
set amount of money with which he can purchase a season ticket to any team in any professional
sport. He must, therefore, decide which sport and which team in that sport to choose. Concerning
which sport to choose, the basic premise of "league sports" is that any individual contest which is
seen as an inevitable victory or defeat will have little or no audience appeal. See notes 86-88 supra
and accompanying text. As a result, if the N.F.L. is able through its draft to maintain a higher
degree of competitive equality than in other league sports, it will compete more effectively with
those sports for the potential ticket purchaser. In turn, other professional sports will seek to
improve the quality of their products in order to compete with professional football. Viewed in
this manner, the N.F.L. player draft produces economic procompetitive benefits.
Once the potential season ticket purchaser has chosen professional football, his next choice is
which team to patronize. Due to normal financial limitations he cannot travel weekly to another
franchised city to see its home games, even though that team may be his favorite team. His choice
is his local team. The result is that, through the franchise system, the local teams have obtained
natural monopolies within their market area, and are thus not in economic competition with other
football franchises.
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While the N.F.L. player draft promotes competitive equality on the
playing field, this is but an intermediate step to the ultimate effect intended by
the player draft, the purpose of which is to promote the quality of professional
football in order to produce more effective competition with other sports
leagues. Enhanced "league sports" competition is the positive, economic
procompetitive benefit of the player service market restraints, which offsets
their anticompetitive effects, thus making the restraints reasonable under the
rule of reason standard.
An examination of judicial, scholarly and congressional reports and
opinions reveals an openness to analysis of the N.F.L. structure as a single
business entity. The unique economic nature of professional sports has
received both judicial recognition 8 and support.9 9 A judicial receptivity
towards accepting the N.F.L. as a single business entity may be inferred from
past judicial opinions recognizing the uniqueness of professional sports, and
in some cases accepting legal theories which would not be permitted in
defense of a normal business enterprise.
In Deesen v. Professional Golfers Ass'n,100 the appellant, a professional
golfer, was eligible to compete as a P.G.A.-approved tournament player in
P.G.A. sponsored and co-sponsored tournaments from 1952 to 1958. Pursuant
to P.G.A. rules, the appellant had to compete in ten P.G.A. sponsored
tournaments each year and maintain an ability to finish "in the money."
During this period he placed in the money three times, earning $240.35. His
expenses from 1952 to 1958 were $13,500.00. In 1958, Deesen sustained an
injury which affected his playing ability and prevented him from competing
in ten tournaments that year. In 1958, the P.G.A.'s national tournament
committee undertook to terminate the approved tournament player status of
a number of professional golfers, including Deesen. On a number of
" The Smith court took cognizance of professional football's unique characteristics, stating:
[Tlhe N.F.L. clubs which have "combined" to implement the draft are not competitors
in any economic sense. The clubs operate basically as a joint venture in producing an
entertainment product - football games and telecasts. No N.F.L. club can produce this
product without agreements and joint action with every other team. To this end the
league not only determines franchise locations, playing schedules, and broadcast terms,
but also ensures that the club receive equal shares of telecast and ticket revenues. These
economic joint ventures "compete" on the playing field, to be sure, but here as well
cooperation is essential if the entertainment product is to attain a high quality: only if
teams are "competitively balanced" will spectator interest be maintained at a high pitch.
No N.F.L. team, in short, is interested in driving another team out of business, whether
in the countinghouse or on the football field, for if the league fails, no one team can
survive.
593 F.2d at 1178-79.
The court in Mackey v. N.F.L., 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 424 U.S. 801
(1977), also noted the "joint venture" characteristics of the N.F.L.: "The N.F.L. assumes some of
the characteristics of a joint venture in that each member club has a stake in the success of the
other teams. No one club is interested in driving another team out of business, since if the League
fails, no one team can survive." Id. at 619. In Kapp v. N.F.L., 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974),
aff'd in part and dismissed in part as moot, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), the necessity for player
restraints was acknowledged "in this unique field of sports league activities . . . wherein to
achieve fairly evenly matched teams on the field, there must be some degree and kind of
restriction on the right of clubs to hire and players to sign as they please." Id. at 81.
" Deesen v. Professional Golfer's Assn of America, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 846 (1966); Molinas v. National Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
100 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966).
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occasions, Deesen applied to the P.G.A. and its tournament committee for
reinstatement but was refused.
The appellant contended, among other things, that through its rules and
regulations governing the eligibility of entrants into P.G.A. sponsored and co-
sponsored tournaments, the P.G.A. had combined and conspired to
unreasonably restrain the business of tournament golf professionals, in
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The court noted that the purpose
of the P.G.A.'s requirement that persons who seek approved tournament
standing meet certain requirements was to insure that professional golf
tournaments were not bogged down with players of inferior ability, and
accepted the P.G.A.'s evidence that the welfare of club professionals has a
direct relationship to the extent of public interest and participation in the
game, and that such interest is maintained only if a high quality of competition
is presented. In conclusion, the court held that the entrance restrictions
imposed by the P.G.A. upon applicants for tournament player status were not
for the purpose of destroying or suppressing competition but in reality
fostered economic competition by maintaining a high quality of athletic
competition. 10 1
In Molinas v. National Basketball Assoc.,102 the plaintiff was drafted by the
Fort Wayne Pistons (now the Detroit Pistons), a member of the defendant
National Basketball Association. In the fall of 1953, he signed a contract to
play with the Pistons but in January of 1954 admitted in writing that he had
placed several bets on the Pistons to win particular games. The president of
the league, acting pursuant to a clause in plaintiff's contract and section 79 of
the league constitution, indefinitely suspended the player from the league.
The plaintiff made several applications for reinstatement, all of which were
refused, and the league president testified that he would never allow the
plaintiff to re-eniter the league.
Plaintiff alleged, among other things, that his suspension by the league and
its subsequent refusal to reinstate him was the result of a conspiracy in
violation of the antitrust laws. In essence the plaintiff alleged that the league's
refusal to allow him to play was a group boycott which foreclosed all
opportunities for him to play professional basketball. The court found the
suspension clause was not only reasonable but necessary to the economic
survival of the league. It stated that although a rule may by its nature involve
some sort of restraint, it may not violate antitrust laws. The court considered
league efforts to maintain public interest and confidence, which is vital to the
league's existence.
In addition to this judicial support, Congress has in certain situations
recognized the N.F.L. as theoretically a single business entity. Congress has
enacted legislation exempting joint arrangements for club television rights
from antitrust laws. Popularly termed the "Sports Broadcast Act," the
legislation permits professional sports leagues to bargain as a unit for the
television contracts of individual teams, free from the restrictions of antitrust
lo Id. at 170. The Deesen court applied the test set forth by the Supreme Court in Chicago
Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231,238 (1918), viz: "The true test of legality is whether
the restraint imposed is such that it merely regulates and thereby perhaps promotes competition,
or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition." 358 F.2d at 170.
'02 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
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laws.10 3 The Football Merger Act, 104 enacted November 8, 1966, authorized
the merger of the American Football League and the National Football
League, again by waiving antitrust limitations.
The Deesen and Molinas opinions, the Sports Broadcast Act and the
Football Merger Act establish that an economic structural analysis of the
N.F.L. as a single business entity is acceptable in the area of antitrust law. This
is the critical step necessary to make the N.F.L. player draft and other player
market restraints reasonable and therefore legal under antitrust law. The
N.F.L. player draft and other player market restraints improve the
competitive equality of clubs on the playing field. This in turn improves the
quality of professional football as an entertainment product, which enables it
to compete more effectively in the professional sports league market. Because
competition in the professional sports league market is economic competi-
tion, the N.F.L. player market restraints have positive, economic pro-
competitive benefits which offset their anticompetitive effects, and, as a
result, are reasonable under the rule of reason test.
C. The Interleague Structural Analysis Argument:
An Extension of the Single Entity Analysis
The Supreme Court's decision in Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc. 05 provides a thought-provoking analogy to the position of the N.F.L.
player draft under the antitrust laws. Continental was a franchised dealer of
Sylvania. Sylvania's franchise plan limited the number of franchises granted
for any given area and required each franchisee to sell his Sylvania products
only from the location or locations in which he was franchised. Under this
plan, Sylvania retained sole discretion to increase the number of retailers in an
area. Dissatisfied with its treatment under the franchise arrangement,
Continental crossclaimed in a suit with the finance company representing
Sylvania, alleging that Sylvania had violated section 1 of the Sherman Act
by entering a franchise agreement which was a per se illegal vertical
restriction.
The district court, applying the Supreme Court's decision in United States
v. Arnold Schwinn and Co.,10 6 agreed with Continental. The Schwinn
franchise plan involved retail customer restrictions, but in intent and
0 The Sports Broadcast Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976) provides that:
The antitrust laws, as defined in Section 1 of the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended
(38 Stat. 730), or in the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended (38 Stat. 717),
shall not apply to any joint agreement by or among persons engaging in or con-
ducting the organized professional team sports of football, baseball, basketball, or
hockey . . . contests sells or otherwise transfers all or any part of the rights of such
league's member clubs in the sponsored telecasting of the games of football, baseball,
basketball, or hockey, as the case may be, engaged in or conducted by such clubs.
104 Pub. L. No. 89-900, 80 Stat. 1515 (1966), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1974):
In addition, such [antitrust] laws shall not apply to a joint agreement by which the
member clubs of two or more professional football leagues, which are exempt from
income tax under section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 [26 U.S.C. § 501(c)
(6)), combine their operations in expanded single league so exempt from income tax, if
such agreement increases rather than decreases the number of professional football
clubs so operating, and the provisions of which are directly relevant thereto.
105 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
106 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
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competitive impact it was indistinguishable from the Continental T.V.
franchise agreement. The Schwinn Court articulated a "bright line" per se rule
of illegality for vertical restrictions, holding that it is per se illegal to seek to
restrict or confine areas within which, or to persons with whom, an article may
be traded, once the manufacturer has parted with dominion of the article.
However, if the manufacturer retains title and therefore the accompanying
risks, the role of the franchised distributor is indistinguishable from that of a
manufacturer's representative or sales agent and the rule of reason applies to
vertical restraints in such a situation. 10 7
The Supreme Court in Continental T.V. overruled the Schwinn decision,
stating that although vertical restrictions have the potential for reduction in
intrabrand competition, they simultaneously have the potential to stimulate
interbrand competition. This "redeeming virtue" may make vertical restric-
tions reasonable' ° even where the manufacturer has not parted with
dominion of the product involved. As a result, vertical restrictions fail to meet
the demanding standards of Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States09 and
cannot be classified as per se illegal.
1. Emphasis Upon Economic Realities Rather
than Form
The Supreme Court's opinion in Continental T.V. is analogous to the
N.F.L. player draft situation in two respects. First, Continental T.V. stated
that the Schwinn Court had erred in placing emphasis upon the "form of the
transaction" instead of upon economic analysis. Schwinn had held that if the
franchised distributor was independent and purchased title to the product, it
was per se illegal for the manufacturer to impose vertical restrictions;
however, if the distributor acted as a sales agent or manufacturer's
representative and never had title to the product, vertical restrictions were not
per se illegal." 0 The Supreme Court in Continental T.V. held that the sales
plans should not have been differentiated based upon the "form of the
transaction" but upon the economic realities which underlie the plans.
Applying this "form of the transaction"/economic reality distinction to the
N.F.L., it is clear that although the N.F.L. is composed of numerous
independent corporations, the courts should not be prohibited from
examining the N.F.L. as one large corporation because it functions as a single
corporation. It is the economic reality of the situation, and not the "form of the
transaction," that should determine whether the N.F.L. is a single corporation.
Just as the vertical restrictions in Continental T.V., while reducing intrabrand
economic competition, were potentially beneficial to interbrand economic
competition, so the N.F.L. player market restraints, although reducing
economic competition between N.F.L. franchises, have positive,
procompetitive benefits as to economic competition between the N.F.L. as a
single entity and other league sports or entertainment packages. The
107 Id. at 379.
10s 433 U.S. at 51-52.
" 356 U.S. 1 (1958); see text accompanying note 23 supra.
110 388 U.S. at 379.
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economic reality that the N.F.L. competes with other entertainment
products, and not the ostensible form of the transaction, should control.
2. Intrabrand v. Interbrand Competition
The distinction between intrabrand and interbrand economic competi-
tion, which prompted the Court in Continental T.V. to overrule Schwinn's
bright line per se illegality rule for vertical restrictions where a manufacturer
has not parted with dominion of the product, is analogous to the distinction set
forth herein as to playing field competition and economic competition with
other league sports or entertainment products. The N.F.L. player draft rules
prohibit clubs from bidding competitively for the services of players drafted
by other N.F.L. clubs, thus hindering intraleague economic competition. The
Standard Player Contract, tampering rule, Rozelle Rule and option clause
rule have similar anticompetitive effects upon intraleague economic competi-
tion," 1 but these player service market restraints clearly improve the N.F.L.'s
ability to compete economically with other sports leagues or entertainment
packages. Although anticompetitive on an intraleague plane, the restraints
may be reasonable on an interleague plane because they enhance economic
competition between sports leagues.
V. CONCLUSION
Two convergent paths of precedent faced the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals in Smith. On one hand were the earlier decisions dealing with the
player service market restraints which held the restraints unreasonable. The
courts in these decisions also stated that if the restraints were tailored to meet
the goals sought, they would be reasonable." 2 On the other hand was the
recent Supreme Court decision in Professional Engineers, requiring that for a
restraint to be reasonable, it must have an economic procompetitive effect
sufficient to offset its economic drawbacks.
As a result of these converging precedential paths, and because the N.F.L.
failed to prove any economic procompetitive benefits which arose from the
player draft, the Smith court was forced to find the draft unreasonable.
However, because the implication of such a decision would be that regardless
of the extent to which the player service market restraints were tailored, they
would still be unreasonable because they failed to provide economic
procompetitive benefits, the Smith court declined to stop there. Instead it
continued, sidestepping the Supreme Court's mandate in Professional
Engineers and contradicting its previous statement, when it wrote that the
draft as it existed in 1968 was unreasonable, but if the draft were tailored to
meet the goals sought, it may be reasonable. This suggestion followed the
trend of Kapp and Mackey regarding the player service market restraints
IH See notes 7-11 supra and accompanying text.
11 See also the discussion of Deesen and Molinas in notes 100-02 supra and accompanying
text. These cases apparently found sufficient economic procompetitive benefits through
enhanced league sports competition as to player restrictions similar to the N.F.L. player service
market restraints.
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before Professional Engineers had been decided.1 3 Thus the Smith court did
not commit itself to either Professional Engineers or the Kapp/Mackey line of
decisions regarding the player service market restraints.
Regardless of the wording of the test applied, the rule of reason, in
conjunction with the Supreme Court's decision in Professional Engineers,
requires that a restraint foster or promote economic competition in order to
be reasonable. Therefore, the Smith court's suggestion that something less
than a net economic procompetitive benefit will suffice to legalize the player
service market restraints is incorrect.
The economic relationship between the teams within the N.F.L. is more
correctly characterized as cooperation than as competition. Thus the N.F.L.
player draft and other player service market restraints will not result in
economic procompetitive benefits between the teams within the N.F.L.
However, had Pro-Football, Inc. argued, and had the Smith court applied, the
single entity structural analysis in its examination of the N.F.L., it would have
found the economic procompetitive effect of the player draft. While the draft
does not promote intraleague economic competition, it promotes interleague
competition. If the Smith court had looked beyond the "form of the
transaction" as the Supreme Court did in Continental T.V. andhad examined
the economic realities of the N.F.L.'s rather unique situation, it would have
found that the N.F.L. functions as a single business entity in competition with
other sports leagues. It is this economic interleague competition which the
N.F.L. player draft promotes and which makes the draft and other player
service market restraints reasonable and legal under antitrust laws.
TERRANCE AHERN
113 See notes 25-36 supra and accompanying text. Note that because the Smith court ruled only
on the 1968 draft, which was more restrictive than the current draft, see note 40 supra, and
because the suggestion persists that sufficient tailoring will make the player service market
restraints reasonable, the legality of the current restraints is undetermined. Nonetheless, in light of
the Professional Engineers requirement of economic procompetitive benefits, and the Smith
court's holding that enhanced playing field competition is wholly noneconomic when the N.F.L.
is viewed as a collection of economic competitors, a new and viable approach to the N.F.L.
economic structure may be key to the N.F.L.'s continued economic survival.
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